The New Yorker argues that the United States was never realistically positioned to “win” the war on terror after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The piece looks at the past 25 years of U.S. military and counterextremism campaigns across multiple regions, noting that these operations have led to large-scale loss of life.
The article frames the question as an assessment of outcomes rather than a focus on battlefield progress alone. It describes the toll of interventions—stating that nearly a million people have died in connection with the broader campaign against extremism—and asks what lasting accomplishments resulted from U.S. efforts. In this presentation, the central angle is skepticism about the very premise of achieving a decisive victory over loosely defined, transnational extremist threats.
Because the provided materials consist only of this single outlet’s perspective, there are no reported differences in framing or emphasis among other sources. The emphasis remains on the mismatch between the war’s stated goal and the complexity and persistence of extremist networks over time.
