Huckabee urges Gulf states to choose Iran or Israel amid US-Israeli war on Iran

UAE joined US-Israeli war against Iran from the outset: Report The United Arab Emirates carried out dozens of air strikes against Iran during the Israeli-US war on the Islamic Republic, according to a report on Friday by The Wall Street Journal, revealing a far deeper and earlier role in the conflict than previously acknowledged. Citing people familiar with the matter, the newspaper said the UAE launched attacks from the opening days of the conflict and continued operations even after a ceasefire was announced in April. The report suggests Abu Dhabi effectively operated alongside the US and Israel as a third participant in the military campaign. The strikes were reportedly coordinated with Washington and Israel, which provided intelligence support. Targets included locations on Qeshm and Abu Musa Islands in the Strait of Hormuz, Bandar Abbas, the Lavan Island oil refinery, and the Asaluyeh petrochemical complex. Read more: UAE joined US-Israeli war against Iran from the outset: Report

UAE joined US-Israeli war against Iran from the outset: Report Submitted by MEE staff on Fri, 05/29/2026 - 21:50 WSJ report reveals UAE carried out strikes on Iran alongside the US and Israel from the start of the war, operating as a third member of the coalition Foreign workers look at a tall plume of black smoke rising after an explosion in the Fujairah industrial zone in the UAE on 3 March 2026 (Fadel Senna/AFP) Off The United Arab Emirates carried out dozens of air strikes against Iran during the Israeli-US war, according to a report by The Wall Street Journal, revealing a far deeper and earlier role in the conflict than previously acknowledged. Citing people familiar with the matter, the newspaper said the UAE launched attacks from the opening days of the conflict and continued operations even after a ceasefire was announced in April. The report suggests Abu Dhabi effectively operated alongside the United States and Israel as a third participant in the military campaign. The strikes were reportedly coordinated with Washington and Israel, which provided intelligence support. Targets included locations on Qeshm and Abu Musa islands in the Strait of Hormuz, Bandar Abbas, the Lavan Island oil refinery and the Asaluyeh petrochemical complex. Several of the attacks hit Iranian energy infrastructure. One strike on the Asaluyeh complex, reportedly carried out in coordination with Israel, triggered international outcry and prompted Washington to urge Israel to halt attacks on energy facilities. Before the conflict, Gulf states publicly insisted they would not allow their territory or airspace to be used for military action against Iran. The report, however, suggests that Abu Dhabi abandoned that position at the outset of the war. Iran responded by targeting Gulf cities, airports and energy infrastructure with missiles and drones in an attempt to raise the cost of the campaign. The UAE absorbed the bulk of those attacks, with more than 2,800 missiles and drones directed at the country. Iranian opposition news site got $800m in debt relief: Report Read More » The UAE's involvement also appears to have deepened divisions among Gulf states. According to the report, Saudi Arabia privately complained to the US in early April that Emirati attacks risked drawing Iranian retaliation against regional energy facilities, potentially disrupting oil markets and threatening the global economy. Saudi officials reportedly pushed Washington to pressure Abu Dhabi to halt military operations and support diplomatic efforts instead. The conflict also exposed tensions between Gulf leaders. Gulf officials cited by the newspaper said UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed became frustrated with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman after Riyadh declined to join coordinated military action against Iran. The scale of retaliation has shaken the UAE’s economy, disrupting air traffic, hitting tourism revenues, and rattling its property market. Companies have announced furloughs and layoffs as the fallout spreads across key sectors. More than $120bn has been wiped from market capitalisation on the Dubai and Abu Dhabi stock exchanges up to the end of April, while over 18,400 flights have been cancelled. War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

Why Trump is using Iran talks to revive the Abraham Accords Submitted by Sean Mathews on Tue, 05/26/2026 - 21:56 Trump's injection of the Abraham Accords into Iran ceasefire talks is a deep misreading of where US Arab allies are at, experts say US President Donald Trump looks on as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman greets the crowd during the Saudi-US investment forum at King Abdul Aziz International Conference Centre in Riyadh, on 13 May 2025 (Fayez Nureldine/AFP) Off President Donald Trump’s injection of the Abraham Accords into talks with Iran underscores how the Islamic Republic is getting the better of the US at the negotiating table, and Trump is trying to distract from it, current and former US and Arab officials told Middle East Eye. “Trump knows he’s getting a deal that undermines every war aim he espoused after 28 February. So, he’s trying to create a bigger deal,” Aaron David Miller, a former Middle East negotiator, told Middle East Eye. “This is a typical Trump ploy,” added Miller, now a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The deal under discussion would extend the shaky ceasefire in place now for 60 days. In exchange for obtaining a sanctions waiver on oil sales, Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, where the US also has a competing naval blockade. The deal does not address Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, which The New York Times has reported is at 70 percent pre-war levels. Trump provided a mixed rationale for his decision to launch a war on Iran, alongside Israel, in February, at times saying it was to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He also said that the US aimed to destroy Iran’s conventional military capabilities, and at other times, he also suggested regime change was the ultimate goal. In a separate social media post on Monday, Trump said Iran’s enriched uranium would either be turned over to the US and destroyed or dismantled in coordination with Iran at an “acceptable location”. The latter statement was read by some observers as a US concession, with China or Russia potentially playing a role. Despite US claims that a deal is close, the current ceasefire between the two countries appeared to be on shaky ground on Tuesday. Iran accused the US of “flagrant” violations of their truce and vowed to respond after the US conducted air strikes against Iranian missile launchers and boats. Misreading the Gulf A former senior US official told MEE that Trump appeared to expect a “payment” from Gulf states for ending the war on Iran. “Trump’s pitch on the Abraham Accords rests on a mistaken impression that the countries that he ensnared into a war that led to the bombings of their cities and critical infrastructure owe him a favour to conclude the war,” the former senior US official told MEE. 'Trump’s pitch rests on a mistaken impression that the countries he ensnared into a war owe him a favour'  - Former senior US official Trump called on several countries that lack diplomatic ties with Israel to normalise, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan. His request came shortly after he spoke with the leaders of those countries, and then with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on a separate call. The US-Israeli war on Iran has jolted the Arab Gulf monarchs, who depend on the US for their security. The UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar lobbied the US against attacking Iran, but bore the brunt of Tehran’s reprisals, with thousands of Iranian missiles and drones hitting their cities, energy infrastructure and US military bases in the countries. The Gulf states generally responded to the war by giving the US greater access to their bases and overflight permissions. Some, like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, even joined in strikes on Iran, according to Reuters. But all share some frustration with Washington. Abu Dhabi has at times called for a more aggressive response, while Saudi Arabia and Qatar have advocated for mediation. Former US officials and Gulf analysts across the region say the war has sparked deep discussions about whether the Gulf states can depend on US security guarantees, but Trump has appeared immune to those concerns. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman "didn’t think this was going to happen…he didn’t think he’d be kissing my ass…he thought it’d be just another American president that was a loser…but now he has to be nice to me,” Trump said at the onset of the war. “The most troubling part of Trump's approach is that he genuinely thinks these countries owe him if he ends the war,” the former senior US official added.  Appeasing Netanyahu and Iran hawks An Arab diplomat told MEE that Trump may have raised the Abraham Accords as a concession to Netanyahu, who analysts say is opposed to ending the war on Iran. Israel is expected to enter elections in the fall, and justifying an end to the war by expanding the Abraham Accords could help it at the ballot box, the Arab official said. UAE and Israel established fund for joint defence acquisition, sources say Read More » Trump may also have to appease Republican allies in Congress who are closely aligned with Netanyahu.  “If it is perceived in the region that a deal with Iran allows the regime to survive and become more powerful over time, we will have poured gasoline on the conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq," US Senator Lindsey Graham wrote on X after Trump announced a deal to end the war was close.  US Senator Ted Cruz called a peace deal a "disastrous mistake".  The UAE, Bahrain and Morocco normalised ties with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords, which Trump considers his major foreign policy achievement. Netanyahu has also been sensitive to the optics of the Abraham Accords at a time when Israel appears isolated on the world stage. His office boasted earlier this month that the Israeli leader made a wartime visit to the UAE, despite Abu Dhabi having to issue an uncomfortable denial. The Gulf rift The war on Iran has exacerbated divisions within the Gulf over Israel and Iran. The UAE has moved closer to Israel as it seeks a new security partner. 'Ideology, family and history': The UAE-Saudi Arabia feud explained Read More » Israel deployed Iron Dome air defence batteries and personnel to the UAE to operate them during the war. MEE revealed that the two also established a fund to jointly acquire and develop new weapons systems. But Saudi Arabia, which Trump has been lobbying without result to normalise ties with Israel since his first term, has grown even more suspicious of Israel as a result of the war. It was already in a rivalry with the UAE and has since pivoted to deepening defence ties with Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt. “The rivalry between the UAE and Saudi means Saudi Arabia is not going to join the Abraham Accords now. If they do normalise, it's going to be under a different name,” Miller said. “The UAE has already doubled down [on Israel]. But why would any Gulf state tether itself to the most extreme, right-wing government in Israeli history that is in the process of annexing the West Bank and occupying Lebanon,” he added. War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0

Why Netanyahu leaked his secret wartime visit to the UAE Submitted by Ali Bakir on Thu, 05/21/2026 - 13:19 By going public with a meeting Abu Dhabi wanted kept quiet, Netanyahu trapped the Emiratis between domestic embarrassment and the regional cost of their Israel ties Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks at a ceremony in Jerusalem, Israel, 21 April 2026 (Ilia Yefimovich/Pool/Reuters) On On 13 May, Benjamin Netanyahu's office issued a brief yet dramatic statement saying that, during the war with Iran, the Israeli prime minister had "secretly visited" the United Arab Emirates and met President Mohammed bin Zayed in what it described as a "historic breakthrough". Hours later, the UAE foreign ministry pushed back with unusual sharpness, calling the report "entirely unfounded" and reminding the world that Emirati-Israeli relations operate openly under the 2020 Abraham Accords. The Emiratis were reportedly furious over the disclosure. Israeli outlets quickly filled in the blanks. The Times of Israel, which is close to Netanyahu, published specific details on the secret trip to further embarrass Abu Dhabi and deliberately undermine its denial. The outlet said the meeting took place on 26 March in the oasis city of Al-Ain, near the Oman border and lasted several hours, adding that "MBZ drove Netanyahu in his personal car from the plane to the palace". Some platforms claimed that flight-tracking data showed two Israeli-linked Bombardier business jets flying from Tel Aviv to Al-Ain that day. Netanyahu's former chief of staff Ziv Agmon wrote openly on Facebook that he had accompanied his boss, that the visit was "top secret until today" and that Sheikh Mohammed personally drove Netanyahu from the airport to the palace. By bringing the visit into the public eye, Netanyahu is pushing the UAE towards a greater acknowledgement of their cooperation, which Abu Dhabi prefers to keep discreet The Wall Street Journal reported that Mossad chief David Barnea had also travelled to the UAE at least twice during the war. Others reported that Shin Bet director David Zini had also visited, while Israeli military chief of staff, Eyal Zamir, was separately reported to have made the trip too. American officials, including US Ambassador Mike Huckabee, had already confirmed that Israel deployed Israeli soldiers to operate Iron Dome batteries on Emirati soil. At this point, two things are clear: Netanyahu did visit, and the UAE denied it. The question is not why Netanyahu visited Abu Dhabi, but why his office leaked the information and why there is an insistence on portraying the UAE as dishonest. Why did Abu Dhabi deny the visit, especially given that their ties are openly governed by the Abraham Accords? And what implications does this public dispute carry for the bilateral relationship? Netanyahu's calculations Netanyahu is the longest-serving prime minister in Israeli history, a politician defined by corruption charges, an ICC warrant and a reputation for authoritarian tendencies. He faces an election later this year, an ongoing corruption trial and an International Criminal Court warrant over Gaza. He needs every win he can claim - particularly one that makes him look like a statesman welcomed in an Arab capital rather than an international pariah. How the Iran war broke the ambitions of 'Little Sparta' Read More » Announcing a face-to-face meeting with the UAE president serves that purpose precisely. It tells the Israeli public that the Abraham Accords have survived the Gaza war. It further signals that Iran failed to isolate Israel during a regional confrontation and that Netanyahu personally can still close deals in the region. In other words, he cashed in a significant diplomatic event for domestic gain - one that appears of far less political significance to the UAE. There are additional motives. By bringing the visit into the public eye, Netanyahu is pushing the UAE towards a greater acknowledgement of their cooperation, which Abu Dhabi prefers to keep discreet. If the Emirates eventually confirm what they currently deny, that confirmation becomes part of Netanyahu's legacy. If they do not, the leak still generates the headlines he wants. In every scenario, Netanyahu gains; in every scenario, the UAE loses. Beyond domestic calculations, there is a message directed at Iran: Israel is capable of moving its prime minister, intelligence chiefs and military chief into the Gulf during a hot conflict. This capability functions as a deterrent in itself. But the most consequential motive is Israel's desire to deepen the rift between the UAE and its regional rivals. By publicly entangling Abu Dhabi in Israeli security arrangements, Netanyahu advances a divide-and-conquer strategy - deepening regional fragmentation while reinforcing the UAE's dependence on Israeli security coordination. This is something the UAE neither needs nor would willingly invite at this stage. Abu Dhabi's dilemma Abu Dhabi's denial is not really about whether the meeting happened. It is about the consequences of admitting it. Four pressures pulled the Emiratis towards a flat rejection. The first is regional public opinion. With images of the Gaza genocide still vivid, hosting Netanyahu publicly would inflame populations across the Arab and Muslim world and damage the UAE's standing within it. Domestically, the UAE has invested heavily in promoting tolerance and coexistence as official values - but the gap between that language and a wartime alignment with Netanyahu is wide enough to feed quiet internal discomfort. Publicly confirming wartime intelligence cooperation with Israel lends credibility to Iran's narrative about GCC complicity Second, the leak sabotages Abu Dhabi's efforts to manage a delicate balancing act: maintaining its normalised ties with countries such as Turkey and Qatar following the resolution of the Gulf crisis in 2021 while sustaining its relationship with Israel in the post-2023 environment. Just before the Iran war erupted, the UAE was already struggling to contain regional anger over its perceived role in Yemen, Somalia, Sudan and Libya - theatres in which Abu Dhabi was widely seen as Israel's proxy. Netanyahu's leak directly undermines that containment effort and leaves the UAE more vulnerable and isolated. Third, the Iranian assault hit the UAE harder than any other Gulf state. According to the Emirati defence ministry, Iran launched more than 550 missiles and 2,200 drones towards the country during the war.  Publicly confirming wartime intelligence cooperation with Israel lends credibility to Iran's narrative about GCC complicity and could justify - in the eyes of Tehran's hardliners - fresh rounds of attacks the UAE cannot easily absorb. Fourth is the Emirati business model. The UAE promotes itself as a stable hub for capital, talent and tourism. Visible entanglement with Israel in a war against Iran is corrosive to that brand and would unsettle investors who need to believe the country is not perpetually under threat. There is also a matter of protocol. The Emirati establishment dislikes being surprised. Netanyahu's unilateral disclosure broke the basic rules of clandestine diplomacy and was read in Abu Dhabi as a domestic political stunt at their expense. The denial is partly a signal that the UAE will not be turned into a prop in an Israeli election campaign. In this sense, Netanyahu’s leak has a real-life political, economic, financial, and security impact on the UAE. But it is not without precedent. In late 2020, Netanyahu leaked his visit to Saudi megacity Neom - a move that backfired badly. Riyadh recognised the tactic for what it was, reversed course on normalisation and hardened its position in ways that still resonate today. Netanyahu's latest leak may reinforce Saudi Arabia's decision to keep normalisation on hold. Whether it produces a similar reckoning in Abu Dhabi is another question - the UAE's entanglement with Israel is deeper and more institutionalised than Riyadh's ever was. But even in Abu Dhabi, some are beginning to ask whether the relationship is worth the cost: whether it undermines Emirati strategic autonomy while drawing the country deeper into conflicts and isolation it cannot control. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. Israel normalisation deals Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0

How the Iran war broke the ambitions of 'Little Sparta' Submitted by Andreas Krieg on Tue, 05/19/2026 - 20:04 The UAE must abandon the illusion of strategic exceptionalism, and rebuild its autonomy through a collective Gulf security order UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed is pictured in Moscow on 29 January 2026 (Maxim Shipenkov/AFP) On The United Arab Emirates has spent two decades trying to escape the ordinary fate of small states through the network power of hyper-connectivity.  It built ports, bought influence, cultivated militias, courted Washington, hedged with Moscow and Beijing, and projected the image of a country too nimble, too wealthy and too useful to be cornered by geography.  The “Little Sparta” brand sounded less like a nickname than a doctrine: a small federation with middle-power ambitions, relative military excellence and enough networked leverage to shape its strategic environment on its own terms. The past three months have exposed the friction between Abu Dhabi’s ambitions and geopolitical realities. Iran’s attacks on Gulf infrastructure have confronted Abu Dhabi with the dissonance between its self-perception as a middle power, and its structural vulnerability as a small state.  Presidential adviser Anwar Gargash recently lashed out at neighbours and partners, posting on X (formerly Twitter): “The friend has turned into a mediator instead of being a steadfast ally and supporter.”  His post captures the frustration in Abu Dhabi over the state’s inability to use its leverage to rally neighbours and partners around a more aggressive stance towards Iran.  In an article last month, Emirati commentator Tareq al-Otaiba denounced Arab solidarity and multilateralism for its inability to collectively deter Iranian aggression. A month earlier, his older brother, the UAE’s ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, announced in an op-ed Abu Dhabi’s readiness to join an “international initiative” to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with the UAE prepared to share the operational burden.  These messages of defiance aim to conceal a harder truth: the UAE’s accumulated levers of influence have not translated into strategic autonomy when confronted by the coercive power of an unrestrained Iran.  Ruthless model The load-bearing assumption that network power can substitute for strategic depth has shown its limits. Under President Mohammed bin Zayed, Abu Dhabi perfected a form of statecraft based on weaponised interdependence.  Logistics corridors and hubs, sovereign wealth funds, information and media networks, commodity traders, private military and security companies, and proxy relationships from Yemen to Sudan gave the UAE reach far beyond its size.  The model was clever, often effective, and at times ruthless. It allowed Abu Dhabi to insert itself into conflicts, markets and diplomatic bargains, while maintaining the aura of a state that shapes events rather than suffers them. The performance of invulnerability has collided with the material facts of proximity, demography and dependence on external security guarantees But power through networks does not translate into the power of outcomes in the Gulf. When the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) decided to escalate, the UAE’s impressive portfolio offered little coercive value.  Despite the UAE luring Russian money and oligarchs to its jurisdiction, Moscow did not come to Abu Dhabi’s defence. Beijing issued the familiar language of concern and stability. Washington reassured, but delivered very little in terms of deterrence.  The very structure that had made the UAE appear indispensable also revealed its limits. Being a hub for global capital, a logistics node for world trade, and a partner to every major power is what made the UAE a prime target for the IRGC. And having entangled IRGC financial networks into Emirati financial institutions and logistics companies was not enough to compel restraint from a neighbour willing to absorb pain. That is the paradox of Emirati statecraft. The UAE has built one of the most sophisticated influence machines in the region, but it remains a prisoner of geography. Its ports sit on the wrong side of Iran’s missile and drone envelope. Its wealth depends on confidence, connectivity and uninterrupted flows. Its economy is a target precisely because it is open, visible and globally networked.  Signalling defiance All Iran needs to do to weaken the UAE strategically is to remind investors, insurers, shipping companies and expatriates that the Emirates is not an exception to the Gulf’s insecurity. This is why the current rhetoric sounds so brittle. Abu Dhabi wants to preserve the image of Little Sparta: disciplined, untouchable, more capable than its neighbours, and certainly not as vulnerable as other small Gulf states. Yet the war has shown that the UAE is exposed to the same regional pressures as every other small Gulf state.  The performance of invulnerability has collided with the material facts of proximity, demography and dependence on external security guarantees. Ambitious Emirati military strikes inside Iran, in retaliation for Iranian strikes on critical UAE national infrastructure, will have done little to restore the balance of deterrence with an IRGC that enjoys a much higher tolerance for pain than the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.  These strikes followed attempts by Mohammed bin Zayed to court his neighbours to join the UAE in a more assertive, joint military campaign against Iran. With the request falling on deaf ears, Abu Dhabi has since resorted to strategic communications as the preferred tool of signalling defiance, assertiveness and strength. Emirati messaging has thereby often come at the expense of its Gulf neighbours, the GCC, the Arab League, and mediating partners such as Pakistan, accusing them of not standing firmly enough with the UAE.  But the complaint also exposes the deeper problem: Abu Dhabi spent years trying to transcend the Gulf’s collective security dilemmas. It treated the GCC less as a necessary regional order than as a constraint on Emirati ambitions. Now, under pressure, it is discovering that the same neighbours it once outmanoeuvred are also the neighbours without whom it cannot stabilise its own environment. Doubling down The instinct in Abu Dhabi will be to double down in the information environment. There will be more lobbying in Washington, more strategic messaging in western capitals, more curated narratives about Emirati resilience and exceptionalism, and more quiet briefings about unreliable neighbours. There will be attempts to turn this crisis into proof that the UAE deserves stronger western guarantees and a harder line against Iran.  But this will not solve the problem.  The UAE does not merely need stronger bilateral assurances from the United States, or a louder diplomatic campaign against Tehran. It needs to accept that its destiny cannot be determined autonomously.  The myth of Gulf exceptionalism and US protection is over Read More » The only viable route to Emirati security runs through a regional security complex in which Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE recognise that their vulnerabilities are shared, even when their policies diverge. There can be no pretending that one of them can secure itself while the others hedge, mediate or burn. Abu Dhabi must stop treating mediation by Pakistan, Qatar or Oman as a betrayal, and start seeing it as part of a division of labour. It must stop viewing Saudi caution as weakness, and recognise that Riyadh’s strategic depth and energy weight are assets that no UAE-led security architecture can replace.  Israeli opportunism to provide operational support for Emirati defence in a war that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unleashed on the region cannot compensate for the UAE’s geographic proximity within a shared Gulf security complex.  Abu Dhabi can shape its destiny only by admitting that it cannot shape it alone. Its ambition as a middle power is not the problem; the problem is the belief that middle-power activism can erase small-state vulnerability.  The UAE’s future security will not be secured by louder narratives of exceptionalism, nor by the fantasy that Little Sparta can stand apart from the Gulf’s collective fate. It will be secured, if at all, by a sober recognition that all Gulf states live under the same shadow, even when they cast different ones. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye. War on Iran How the Iran war shattered the illusions of the UAE as a rising power Opinion Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:29 Update Date Override 0

Trump says Gulf leaders asked him to 'hold off' on resuming Iran war Submitted by MEE staff on Mon, 05/18/2026 - 20:11 A 'large scale assault' was 'scheduled' for Tuesday, the US president said US President Donald Trump returns to the White House in Washington, DC, after his trip to China, on 15 May 2026 (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters) Off The US will no longer resume its "full, large scale" war on Iran on Tuesday, because Gulf leaders have requested Washington to hold off, President Donald Trump has said.  "I have been asked by the Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, and the President of the United Arab Emirates, Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to hold off on our planned Military attack of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which was scheduled for tomorrow, in that serious negotiations are now taking place, and that, in their opinion, as Great Leaders and Allies, a Deal will be made," the US president wrote on his TruthSocial account on Monday. That prospective deal "will be very acceptable to the United States of America", and "will include, importantly, NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR IRAN!" Trump added. He said his "respect" for the rulers of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE led him to accept their request.  The US military will be "prepared to go forward with a full, large scale assault of Iran, on a moment’s notice, in the event that an acceptable Deal is not reached," the president warned.  A shaky ceasefire has been in place since mid-April, brokered by Pakistan, following some 40 days of war. On Friday, Bloomberg reported that the UAE made a failed bid to convince Saudi Arabia and Qatar to launch a joint military response to Iran’s attacks on the Gulf. UAE UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed held a series of calls with Gulf leaders, including Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, shortly after the US and Israel attacked Iran on 28 February. Tehran responded by launching thousands of missiles and drones at the Gulf states.  UAE and Israel established fund for joint defence acquisition, sources say Read More » The UAE, which normalised ties with Israel in 202o under the Abraham Accords, bore the brunt of the retaliation, with almost 3,000 missiles and drones striking the country. The war has drawn Israel and the UAE even closer. Middle East Eye reported on Monday that the two countries have established a joint defence acquisition fund to acquire and develop new weapons systems. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Gulf leaders rebuffed Mohamed bin Zayed’s request for a coordinated Gulf attack on Iran. It has now been reported that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE launched retaliatory strikes on Iran, but did so independently. The UAE targeted Iranian energy sites. The Wall Street Journal reported the UAE hit Iran’s Lavan Island in the Gulf in early April, around the time the US was announcing a ceasefire. Saudi Arabia’s strikes have been described by analysts as measured, and the kingdom quickly pivoted to supporting mediation efforts by its ally, Pakistan. At the same time, the kingdom has floated a non-aggression pact between Iran and Middle Eastern states based on a 1970s agreement that eased tensions in Europe during the Cold War, The Financial Times reported last week. The Saudi Arabian efforts have gained the support of European capitals and EU institutions, but it's unclear if Israel and the US would support it. War on Iran News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0